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OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF JOINT
TENANCY IN WISCONSIN*
PATRICK W. COTTER**
The confusion existing in the law of Joint Tenancy in the United
States has been due to the enactment of statutes reflecting the hostility
in this country to the presumption which had been created under the
common law in England in favor of Joint Tenancy, and thereby to
limit and in some cases abolish the primary incident of the tenancy-
survivorship. Because of its harshness, the doctrine of survivorship
became extremely unpopular in England' as well as the United States.
The statutes enacted to accomplish this end were of three general types:
(1) those expressly abolishing joint tenancy as an estate ;2 (2) those
abolishing survivorship ;3 and (3) those reversing the common law
presumption by requiring the deed or grant to contain an expression of
intention on the part of the grantor to create a joint tenancy.4
* This is the first part of an article which will be presented in this and the next
two succeeding issues of the Marquette Law Review.
** Associate, Wood, Warren, Tyrell & Bruce; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; B.A. Uni-
versity of Wisconsin 1938; LL.B. University of Wisconsin; 1940; LL.M. Uni-
versity of Wisconsin 1946; Member of Milwaukee County and Wisconsin Bar
Associations. The Author would like to acknowledge the research assistance
of Walter P. Rynkiewicz, member of the law firm of Puhr, Peters, Holden &
Schlosser, Sheboygan, Wisconsin; L.L.B. Marquette University 1955.
'In Williams v. Hensman, Johns & H. 457, we find these remarks of V.C.W.
Page Wood: "In these questions of joint-tenancy the court has frequently
been driven to rely on minute grounds for holding a severance to have taken
place, by the unfortunate circumstance that the Legislature has not thought
fit to interpose by introducing the rule, that express words shall be required
to create a joint-tenancy, in place of the contrary rule which is established,
that words pointing to severalty of interest are necessary to constitute a
tenancy in common. Under certain circumstances, as in the case of mortgages
of trust money, a joint-tenancy is a considerable convenience; but it would
be very desirable that, in general, in the absence of any express direction, a
tenancy in common should be the construction adopted."2 1n this category Freeman, COTENANCY AND PARTITION, p. 84 (1886) places
Georgia, Ohio, Oregon and Tennessee. See, however, O'Connell, Are Joint
Tenancies Abolished in Oregon? 21 ORE. L. REV. 159 (1941); Kuykendall,
Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by the Entireties in Real and Personal Property
in Oregon, 100 ORE. L. REv. 388 (1931). Brewster, CONVEYANCE (1904), p. 151,
lists Georgia and Oregon in this class.
3 Freeman, COTENANCY AND PARTITION (1886), p. 84: Alabama, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Illinois, Florida, North Carolina, Penn., So. Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia and Kentucky. Conn. abolished survivorship by judicial de-
cision in Wittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 340. Brewster, CONVEYANCES (1904) :
Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, N. Carolina, Penn., So. Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, Washington, W. Virginia.
4 Freeman, op. cit., p. 84: Arkansas, California, Dakotas, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mass., Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin. Brewster, op. cit.:
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Wisconsin.
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The statutes adopted in Wisconsin are of the third type,5 and since
the purpose of this paper is to present the Wisconsin law on this sub-
ject, the interesting problems and difficulties created by statutes of the
first two types will not be discussed, except as they may be alluded to
by way of comparison. 6 Under the Wisconsin statutes the common law
of joint tenancy is preserved, except as specifically modified by statute.7
The plan of presentation, therefore, is to review the principles of the
common law and then to discuss the statutory changes and their inter-
pretation and application by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The most inclusive definition of joint tenancy is presented by Mr.
Freeman as a modification of one by Mr. Preston :8
Joint Tenancy is when two or more persons, not being husband
and wife at the date of its acquisition, have any subject of prop-
erty jointly between them in equal shares by purchase. 9
Thus phrased, tenancies by the entirety are excluded and personal
property is included. The most popular characterization of the estate
comes from Blackstone:
The properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity which
is fourfold: the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of
time, and the unity of possession, or in other words, joint
tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the
same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and
held by one and same undivided possession. 0
Blackstone's "four unities" have been seized on by courts and writers
as laying down the test for the creation or existence of a joint tenancy.11
This is not the true test, for although the unities are usually present,
they are not indispensible.12 Unity of interest may be lacking as where
5 Wis. STAT. (1953) §§230.43; 230.44; 230.45. See infra, pages 13 et seq. Notes
See 11-8, 9 and 10.
6 See problems discussed by Freeman, op. cit., §§39 and 40.
7§230.43 Wis. STAT. (1953).
8 1 Preston on Estates 136 (1820).
9 Freeman, op. cit., p. 64. Other less comprehensive definitions have been at-
tempted by Littleton, Blackstone and Kent: "Joyntenants are, as if a man be
seized of certain lands or tenements, etc., and enfeoffeth two, three, or four,
or more, to have and to hold to them for terme of there feoffment or lease
they are seized, these are joyntenants." Littleton, §277.
"An estate in joint tenancy is where lands or tenements are granted to two
or more persons to hold in fee simple, feetail, for life, for years, or at will."
2 BL. COMM. 180.
"Joint-tenants are persons who own lands by a joint title, created expressly
by one and the same deed or will. They hold uniformly by purchase." 4
Kent's CoMM. 357.
:0 2 BL. CoM. 180; 4 DANE'S AB. 758.
:113 Thompson, REAL PROPERTY §1776; 1 Pengrey, Real Property 679; 3 Kerr,
REAL PROPERTY 1878. Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542; Siberell v. Siberell,
214 Col. 767, 7 P.2d 1003; Liese v. Hentze, 326 Ill. 633, 158 N.E. 428; Appeal of
Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 At. 459; Moore Lumber Co. v. Behrman, 259
N.Y.Supp. 248; Farr v. Trustees, 83 Wis. 446, 53 N.W. 738; Bassler v. Rewod-
linski, 130 Wis. 26, 109 N.W. 1032.
122 American Law of Property, §6.1, §6.4.
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•.. a rent charge be granted to A and B to have and to hold to
them two, vis. to A until he be married, and to B until he be
advanced to a benefice, they be joyntenants in the meantime, not-
withstanding the several limitations.1
3
Or the estate may be acquired at different times, as in the case of uses
and executory devises. 1 4 Unity of possession is common to all co-
tenancies; and there seems to be no exception to the rule that the title
of joint tenants must arise from one act, deed or devise.15
In his comments on Blackstone's four unities, Mr. Challis says:
This analysis has perhaps attracted attention rather by reason of
its captivating appearance of symmetry and exactness, than by
reason of its practical utility. It means only, that each joint
tenant stands, in all respects, in exactly the same position as each
of the others; and that anything which creates a distinction
either severs the joint tenancy or prevents it from arising.16
Each joint tenant is regarded as the tenant of the whole estate for
purposes of tenure and survivorship, while for the purposes of aliena-
tion and forfeiture each has an undivided share only.'
7
The distinguishing incident of joint tenancy, however, is the doc-
trine of survivorship, "by which.., the entire tenancy upon the decease
of any one of them remains to the survivors, and at length to the last
survivor; and he shall be entitled to the whole estate, whatever it may
be.""' The heirs of the deceased joint tenant take nothing. It is this
incident of joint tenancy that has caused the courts so much difficulty.
It was felt that it is inconsistent with normal desires for a man to hold
property in such a manner that when he dies his heirs can have no
interest in it.19
However, in spite of the fact that this feeling manifested itself in
equity the common law judges favored the creation of joint tenancies,
because, due to the doctrine of survivorship, it prevented fractions of
estates and the feudal burdens of the tenants were lessened. Since
only one suit and service was due the lord from all the joint tenants,
on the death of one, the others acquired his share free from the bur-
dens in favor of the lord which ordinarily accrued on the death of a
'3 Co. Lrrr. 180 6; see also 4 Kent CoMM. 357; note to 2 BL. COMm. 181; Co. Lin.
184a; Crary v. Welles, 2 P.Wm.s 530; Cook v. Cook, 2 Vern. 545.
14 Thus a devise or limitation to the use of the children of A will give each child
an estate as soon as born, and yet all will hold as joint tenants. 2 American
Law of Property, §6.1.
35 2 American Law of Property, §6.1. Today statutes and decisions in most juris-
dictions change the old common law rule which held a conveyance by a sole
owner to himself and another cannot create a joint tenancy. See §230.45(3)
Wis. Stats. (1953), and material in Part II of this article.
16 Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY (3rd Ed., 1911), 367.
1Tiffany, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (3rd Ed. 1920), 196. Challis, op. cit., 367;
1 Preston, op. cit. 136. Co. Lir. 186a; Wythes Virginia Reports, pp. 361, 391
and Notes.
182 BL. CoMm. 184; Freeman, op. cit. 66.
19 Freeman, op. cit. 67.
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tenant of land.20 Joint tenancy was frequently adopted to prevent dower
and courtesy from attaching; it avoided wardship, primer seisin and
other feudal imposts. Thus at the common law a conveyance to two or
more persons, where there were no words to indicate a contrary in-
tention, created a joint tenancy. Nor would equity refuse to follow the
law in enforcing the rights of survivorship in the absence of a contrary
intention. But after the abolition of feudal tenures equity was quick
to find the requisite expressions of intention to defeat survivorship.
If in the creation of the estate or in the severance of it a doubt existed,
it was resolved by equity in favor of tenancy in common.21 The three
most common cases in which equity inferred an intention not to create
a joint tenancy were (1) where land is acquired jointly by two or more
for the purpose of undertaking a partnership, (2) where money was
advanced on a joint mortgage by two or more persons, and (3) where
on a joint purchase of land, the purchase money is contributed in un-
equal shares.22
It was this abhorrence of the equity courts for the doctrine of sur-
vivorship that was carried over to the colonies and was reflected in the
statutes of every state in its attempt to limit its application by chang-
ing the common law rules.
Because of the presumption, no words of art were necessary for
the creation of a joint tenancy-either at law or in equity. Any deed or
devise to two or more persons, not husband or wife, would create a
joint tenancy. In fact, words or circumstances of negation were neces-
sary to avoid the operation of the presumption. Thus the problem of
construction before the common law and equity courts, as distinguished
from that which is before the Wisconsin Court today, was whether the
words used by the grantor or devisor expressed an intent to create a
tenancy in common.
The estate must always arise by purchase and can never be acquired
by descent. "Purchase includes every mode of coming to an estate
except inheritance." 23 A corporation may not hold in joint tenancy
with an individual nor may two corporations so hold.24 But all natural
persons may be joint tenants.25 Whatever property may be held in sole
ownership may also be held jointly. There is no restriction on the type
of property to be held in joint tenancy nor on the nature of the estate
with regard to quantity of interest. It may be equitable as well as legal
20 Tiffany, op. cit. 201; Co. Lrrr. 706; 2 BL. Comm. 180, 193; 4 Kent Comm. 361.
21 Tiffany, op. cit. 201.
22 Cheshire, MODmR LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (5th Ed. 1944), 551 et seq.
232 American Law of Property §62. "A joint tenancy arises only by purchase;
that is, by deed or by will or by adverse possession. If the property descends
to heirs from an ancestor who dies intestate, the heirs take as tenant in corn-
com."
242 American Law of Property, §6.3 n. 4; Tiffany, op. cit., 205; Co. Lrrr. 190a.
2 5Freeman, op. cit., 69.
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and may be undivided as well as in severalty. Hence, if three persons
hold as joint tenants, and one conveys to a third, the other two will
remain joint tenants as between themselves though their title is for only
two-thirds of the estate.26 And all species of personalty, tangible and
intangible, may be so held.2 7 The rule at common law as to a mortgage
given to two creditors to secure a debt owed jointly to them was that
such mortgage was held in joint tenancy during the existance of the
mortgage and the mortgagees will have to pursue their remedy or fore-
closure by a joint action. If, however, the debts secured are several
debts of the mortgagees, the presumption of joint tenancy is rebutted
and each mortgagee may maintain a separate action on the mortgage.
Equity would even refuse to extend the former rule beyond permitting
the surviving mortgagee to sue, and holding the proceeds as trustee of
the representative of his deceased co-mortgagee.28
Before considering the methods by which a joint tenancy may be
terminated, it would be in order to discuss the law governing the rights,
duties and liabilities of joint tenants in their relation with one another
and in their relations with strangers.2 Since these rules of law are,
in the main, applicable to all types of cotenancies and are not peculiar
to joint tenancy, they are not within the scope of this paper. However,
in passing, several instances of such rules which are peculiar to joint
tenancy are noted. In a conveyance by one cotenant to another, the
proper mode of transfer for a joint tenant is a release to the others of
his interest. However, where a form of conveyance other than a re-
lease contains terms broad enough to comprehend a release it will be
allowed to operate accordingly and transfer the interest of the joint
tenant; the general rule being that a deed should always be carried into
effect if possible since the primary intent of the grantor is presumed
to have been to pass the land. 0
In actions against strangers or actions by strangers against co-
tenants problems of joinder of parties arise. Insofar as real actions are
concerned, where title is jointly held, as in joint tenancy and coparceny,
the action must also be joint. Whenever the cotenants are deemed to
possess separate and distinct estates, as in tenancy in common, they
must pursue their remedies separately.3 ' However, in personal actions
based on an injury to the possession such as trespass, cotenants should
join, whether they hold in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or co-
parceny 12 In actions of ejectment, joint tenants may sue either jointly
26 Tiffany, op. cit., 209.
272 American Law of Property, §6.4.
28 Freeman, op. cit., 70.
29 Freeman, op. cit., Chaps. VIII-XVI.
30 3 American Law of Property, §12.94; 2 Cruise, TITLES l8cs. §22.
31 Tiffany, op. cit., 295; Co. LiTr. 1806.
32Ibid.
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or separately depending on the nature of the fictitious demise.33 In
equitable proceedings all cotenants must join or be joined regardless of
the nature of the tenancy 3 4
A joint tenancy may be terminated by a destruction of any one of
the four unities; this act of destruction, whether done by one or more
of the tenants, by a stranger, or by operation of law, is called a sev-
erance and results in the property being held thereafter in tenancy in
common or in severalty.3 5 Where there are three or more joint tenants
and the joint tenancy is terminated as to one, the remaining tenants
continue to hold in joint tenancy among themselves, but as tenants in
common with respect to the share of the joint tenant whose interest has
been terminated. So also if there are eight joint tenants and five effect
a severance, the three remain joint tenants with one another and the
five become joint tenants of the portions severed and appropriated by
them.38
The unities of title and of time are destroyed by an alienation by
one of the joint tenants which creates a severance as to that share. Thus
a conveyance in fee by one joint tenant to a stranger creates an interest
in the stranger through a different title and at a different time than the
interest of the cotenants and the relationship is one of tenancy in com-
mon. A conveyance to a stranger for life will also effect a severance
so that the grantee for life and the other joint tenant will hold as
tenants in common and upon the death of either of the former joint
tenants during the existence of the life estate, there is no right of sur-
vivorship-the interest of each passes to his heirs. Whether the joint
tenancy as it originally existed revives at the termination of the life
estate, both joint tenants living, is not altogether clear. Lord Coke
states, ". . . if tenant for life dyeth in the life of both joyntenants, they
are joyntenants again as they were before." He recognizes authority
to the contrary, however.3 7
Where the joint tenancy is in fee and one of the joint tenants makes
a lease for years, the authorities are in dispute as to whether a sever-
ance is effected. Freeman says,
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., Story's EQ. PL. §159.
35 Freeman, op. cit., §29 et seq. seems to consider partition as a means of termin-
ating a joint tenancy as distinct from severance. Cheshire, op. cit., 555 con-
siders that a joint tenancy in any event is terminated by a severance of which
there are four modes: (1) Alienation by one joint tenant; (2) Aquisition by
one tenant of a greater interest than those held by his cotenants; (3) parti-
tion; (4) sale. Tiffany, op. cit., 208 also considers partition as a mode of sev-
erance destroying the unity of possession.
36 Freeman, op. cit., 84.
37 Tiffany, op. cit., p. 209; Co. Lnr. 193a. The following comment is made in 2
PREsToN ON ABSTRAcrs (1824) 59: "And if two or more persons are joint-
tenants in fee, in tail, or for any less estate of freehold, and one of them grant
a particular estate of freehold, retaining a reversion, this grant will suspend
the joint-tenancy. Should the particular estate determine during the lives of
the joint-tenants, the joint-tenancy will be revived."
195]
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A demise by one of the joint tenants severs the joint-tenancy
and turns it into a tenancy in common, although the lease is not
to commence until after the lessor's death.33
Cheshire maintains that where a joint tenancy is in fee and one joint
tenant makes a lease for years, the better opinion is that no severance
is effected. Whereas, on the other hand, if the subject of the joint
tenancy is itself a term for years, a lease for years by one of the joint
tenants produces a complete severance.39 Tiffany refuses to commit
himself on the first proposition stated by Cheshire but agrees on the
second.40
Because of the doctrine of survivorship, no severance can result
from a disposition by will.4' A contract of sale by a joint tenant effects
a severance in equity.4 2 At common law when a joint tenant mortgages
his interest a severance will result.43 Sale on execution upon a judg-
ment against a joint tenant will sever the tenancy,44 and even a mere
seizure under execution apart from sale or issuance of execution, if
without any further proceedings a venditioni exponas may be taken
out and the lands sold, has been held to effect a severance.45 An agree-
ment by the joint tenants to hold as tenants in common or that the
tenancy be severed will be given effect.46
Not only does the conveyance to a stranger have the effect of a
severance but the same result will occur where one joint tenant releases
his interest to another joint tenant,47 and if there is only one other joint
tenant the tenancy is terminated because there is no longer a concurrent
ownership. If there are two or more joint tenants beside the releasing
tenant, the remaining ones continue to hold their interest in joint ten-
ancy and are tenants in common with respect to the interest released.4
Unity of interest may be destroyed and the tenancy severed when
one of the joint tenants acquires an interest greater in quantum than
that held by his cotenants ;49 this might occur among joint tenants for
3 Freeman, op. cit., 82.
39 Cheshire, op. cit., 555 et seq.
40 Tiffany, op. cit., p. 210.
412 BL. COMM. 185-6.
42 2 American Law of Property, §6.2, §6.3.
43 Tiffany, op. cit. 210. York v. Stone, 1 Eq. Cos. Abr. 293. The same result
undoubtedly follows in jurisdictions where a mortgage operates to transfer
legal title would not operate as a severance. Co. Lirr. p. 286; Co. Lirr. 184, 185a.
nnTy §1781. Although in one lien theory state the same result was reached,
Wilkins v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68, it would seem an analogy to com-
mon law authority on charges on land or grants of a mere incorporeal thing
such as a right of profit, that a mortgage which does not involve a transfer of
legal title would not operate as a severance. Co. Lrrr. p. 286; Co. LTrr. 184,
185a. Tiffany, op. cit. 210.
44 Tiffany, op. cit., §211.
, Tiffany, op. cit., §211.
46 Freeman, op. cit., 83.
4T Tiffany, op. cit., §211.
48 Ibid.
49 Cheshire, op. cit., 556.
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life where one tenant acquires the fee either by purchase or inheritance.
Unity of possession may be destroyed by a partition or by a sale.50
All the tenants might join and make a deed to a stranger and that
would operate to terminate the tenancy. Partition may be either vol-
untary, where all the tenants agree, or compulsory, where the court
will effect a partition or a sale and the distribution of the proceeds on
the petition of one or more of the joint tenants.51
(To be continued)
50 Tiffany, op. cit., §212.5 On the subject of partition see Freeman, op. cit., Chaps. XVLLL-XXIX; Tiff-
any, op. cit., §§468, 473.
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